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INTERPRETIVE SCHIZOPHRENIA:  HOW 
CONGRESSIONAL STANDING CAN SOLVE THE 
ENFORCE-BUT-NOT-DEFEND PROBLEM 
Abner S. Greene* 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) provides: 
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and 
agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a legal 
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the 
word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a 
husband or a wife.1 
On February 23, 2011, Attorney General Holder informed House Speaker 
Boehner by letter that President Obama had determined that section 3 is 
unconstitutional as applied to “same-sex couples who are legally married 
under state law.”2  Heightened scrutiny should apply, wrote Holder, and 
accordingly the Department of Justice (DOJ) would not defend section 3 in 
circuit courts where the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny was 
still open.3  The DOJ would defend the statute, however, were a circuit to 
determine that only the rational basis test need apply.4  Holder also wrote: 
 Notwithstanding this determination, the President has informed me that 
Section 3 will continue to be enforced by the Executive Branch.  To that 
end, the President has instructed Executive agencies to continue to 
comply with Section 3 of DOMA, consistent with the Executive’s 
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, unless and 
until Congress repeals Section 3 or the judicial branch renders a definitive 
verdict against the law’s constitutionality.  This course of action respects 
 
*  Leonard F. Manning Professor, Fordham Law School.  I am grateful to Pamela Terry for 
expert research assistance.  Thanks also to David Barron, Joe Landau, Ethan Leib, Dan 
Meltzer, and Aaron Saiger for written comments and tough questions. 
 1. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006). 
 2. Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to John A. 
Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 23, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/February/11-ag-223.html. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
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the actions of the prior Congress that enacted DOMA, and it recognizes 
the judiciary as the final arbiter of the constitutional claims raised.5 
This means that if, say, two women are legally married under New York 
law and seek a federal benefit owed to a married couple, the benefits 
administrator must say No, the couple could then file a lawsuit, and then the 
DOJ will refuse to defend.  If that were the end of the matter, we’d have a 
default judgment, but Congress could intervene as a defendant (more on 
this later), so we’d have a proper case between adverse parties (with, as has 
happened, the DOJ filing a brief supporting the married couple).  This is 
interpretive schizophrenia6:  the very same President is enforcing a law he 
believes to be unconstitutional—and harming people7—and then in the next 
breath refusing to defend the law because he believes it to be 
unconstitutional.  As I’ll say a bit about below, the “Take Care Clause” 
argument is a nonstarter.8  The best reason for the “enforce but not defend” 
position offered by Holder is the justiciability point:  that the buck 
shouldn’t stop with the President, as it might if he refused to enforce the 
law, but rather should stop with the courts or with Congress were it to 
repeal the law.9 
There are two possible arguments against this position:  one, that it’s fine 
for the buck to stop with the President if he believes the law is 
unconstitutional;10 two, that were the President not to enforce section 3, it 
would be appropriate for Congress to sue the President to seek a judicial 
declaration regarding the statute’s constitutionality, even though there 
would be no classically injured private party.  I’ll write briefly about the 
first possibility and then focus on the second.  To summarize:  On the first:  
although the President has broad constitutional interpretive authority, the 
 
 5. Id.; see also Letter from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
John A. Boehner, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Feb. 17, 2012), available at 
http://sldn.3cdn.net/b43c938d6601df41b9_26m6bu2hc.pdf. 
 6. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 570 (2012) (“The Holder letter . . . is a curious blend of presidential 
interpretive autonomy and the DOJ’s obligations to the courts . . . .”). 
 7. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Presidential Non-enforcement of Constitutionally 
Objectionable Statutes, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 58 (2000) (setting forth harm from 
presidential enforcement of a law he deems unconstitutional, in a different setting). 
 8. See infra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 9. See Johnsen, supra note 7, at 35, 40, 41, 47–50, 51; see also Memorandum from 
Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Abner J. Mikva, White House Counsel ¶ 5 (Nov. 
2, 1994), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm.  Professor Meltzer also 
raises a kind of interpretive chaos concern with “a regime in which each administration 
views itself as having significant latitude to refuse to enforce and defend acts of Congress.” 
Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61 DUKE L.J. 1183, 1228 
(2012).  The alternative of the executive presumptively kowtowing to Congress and to the 
courts is not particularly attractive, though, and if the President exercises appropriate 
interpretive humility (as should all three branches), we might achieve true multi-branch 
constitutional dialogue. See infra note 13. 
 10. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 509; see also Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1224 
(describing the argument). 
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passive virtues apply to him as well as to the Article III courts,11 and going 
it alone makes less structural constitutional sense than involving both 
Congress and the courts.  On the second:  We should be open to 
congressional lawsuits in settings such as this, and there’s a net gain from 
operating this way as opposed to creating scores of injured private parties 
who then have to engage in litigation.12 
I.  PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATION 
There is no interpretive obligation in constitutional law.  Or rather, there 
shouldn’t be.  In other words, when interpreting the U.S. Constitution, one 
need not defer to either prior or higher authority, even merely 
presumptively.  Prior authority:  neither the original intent (understanding) 
of the framers (or ratifiers) nor the original public meaning of the 
Constitution’s text is binding on present-day interpreters.  The same goes 
for precedent.  Higher authority:  what the Supreme Court thinks the 
Constitution means, at any moment in time, is not binding on other 
government officials (except that court judgments are binding).  I have 
developed these arguments recently13 and will say only a bit about them 
here.  The President has constitutional interpretive authority coordinate with 
that of Congress and the federal courts.  Sometimes called 
“departmentalism,” the idea is that the Constitution doesn’t place 
interpretive authority in the courts alone; each branch of government must 
interpret the Constitution in carrying out its functions.14  One function of 
 
 11. See Joseph Landau, The President and the Passive Virtues (Sept. 6, 2012) 
(unpublished article) (on file with author). 
 12. There are several recent examples of federal benefits denied to legally married same-
sex couples because of DOMA section 3. See, e.g., Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 
2d 394, 397–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 
4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 18, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-63 (U.S. 
July 15, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012) Gill 
v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 699 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379–84 (D. Mass. 2010), aff’d sub nom. 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).  In a nod 
to the difficult position the President is in when denying benefits he believes are 
constitutionally due, the DOJ filed in the Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari 
before the Ninth Circuit’s judgment in Office of Personnel Management v. Golinski, arguing 
for this unusually expedited review in part because “[e]xecutive departments and agencies 
will continue to deny federal benefits to scores of affected individuals until this Court 
reaches a definitive resolution of the question presented.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 
Before Judgment at 15, Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Golinski, No. 12-16 (U.S. July 3, 2012). 
 13. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION:  THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY chs. 3–4 (2012). 
 14. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 
83 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1421 (1999); Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 522, 526–32; Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 905 (1990); Gary 
Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 
IOWA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:  
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1995); Saikrishna 
Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1613, 1616 (2008); Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation:  Three 
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 778–79 (2002). 
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the President is executing the laws, and he must interpret the Constitution in 
doing that, as well as in performing more unilateral tasks, such as 
exercising the pardon, veto, or commander in chief powers.15 
As have others, I reject the following arguments for a more deferential 
presidential posture:  that he should interpret the Constitution as he believes 
the Supreme Court would;16 that the presidential oath requires a more 
deferential approach;17 that the Take Care Clause does, as well;18 and that 
the President’s power to resist legislation as unconstitutional ends with the 
veto power.19  The first argument is directly contradictory to the tenets of 
departmentalism.20  The oath argument turns on an understanding of 
faithful execution, or of preserving, protecting, and defending the 
Constitution, as including deference to Congress (and the Courts), but that 
position begs the question whether faithful execution et al. require 
deference rather than (at least some degree of) interpretive independence.21  
The same can be said of the Take Care Clause argument, i.e., whether 
taking care that the laws are faithfully executed requires deferring to 
Congress’ (or the courts’) view of constitutionality is the question to be 
discussed; maybe faithful execution means the President should not enforce 
 
 15. But see Geoffrey P. Miller, The President’s Power of Interpretation:  Implications of 
a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35, 37–38 (1993) 
(generally endorsing departmentalism, but less so regarding nonenforcement of domestic 
legislation; there he urges more deference to Congress). 
 16. See Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not to Enforce, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 116 (2000); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 9, ¶ 4; 
see also David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the Constitution, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 113, 113 (1993).  David Strauss’s views are halfway between the positions of Walter 
Dellinger, see supra note 9, and David Barron, see infra note 20. 
 17. But see Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 521–22, 523–26; Prakash, supra note 14, 
at 1616 (in both pieces, arguing that the oath prevents the President from enforcing laws he 
deems unconstitutional). 
 18. But see Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 522, 532–35; Prakash, supra note 14, at 
1616 (in both pieces, arguing that the Take Care Clause prevents the President from 
enforcing laws he deems unconstitutional). 
 19. See Christopher N. May, Presidential Defiance of “Unconstitutional” Laws:  
Reviving the Royal Prerogative, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 867 (1994). 
 20. See Prakash, supra note 14, at 1674; see also David Barron, Constitutionalism in the 
Shadow of Doctrine:  The President’s Non-enforcement Power, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
61, 81, 88 (2000) (arguing that it doesn’t make sense for the President to defer to the Court 
when the Court’s interpretive structure is based on complex tiers of deference to the political 
branches, and he adds that enforcement to tee up justiciability might matter only if the courts 
need to resolve relative interpretive authority of the President versus Congress). 
 21. See Meltzer, supra note 9, at 1195–96. 
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laws he believes to be unconstitutional.22  Finally, I join those who believe 
the veto power to be one stage, (non)enforcement decisions, another.23 
Although the arguments for presidential constitutional interpretive 
authority are strong—even in executing domestic legislation—Professor 
Prakash goes too far when he argues that the Constitution requires the 
President to “disregard unconstitutional statutes.”24  The President, no less 
(or more) than the other branches, should engage in interpretive humility;25 
part of doing his job properly may involve (at least in some instances) 
deference to other branches’ views of constitutional meaning.  My 
arguments against interpretive obligation are not arguments against judicial 
review, and inter-branch interpretive dialogue is enhanced when the 
President gives the courts an opportunity to weigh in on his 
(non)enforcement decisions based on his reading of the Constitution.  
Although judicial review may be less important for some President-
Congress battles, enforcement vel non of domestic legislation usually 
implicates private parties in one way or another, and thus we should 
consider appropriate mechanisms for judicial involvement. 
If the President declines to enforce a law because he deems it 
unconstitutional, Congress sues, the case goes to the Supreme Court, and 
the Court rules in favor of Congress, I am assuming the Court would issue a 
declaratory judgment, telling the President that his constitutional basis for 
nonenforcement is incorrect.  How one thinks about what the President may 
do next depends on what sort of departmentalist one is.  The weakest 
departmentalism would just grant the President authority to interpret the 
Constitution when engaged in unilateral functions such as the veto and the 
pardon.  The strongest departmentalism would go all the way to permitting 
the President to disobey a court judgment in a specific case.  My 
departmentalism is somewhere between these two; I have argued that the 
President may interpret the Constitution when enforcing the law and when 
deciding how to account for judicial precedent, but not that he may disobey 
court orders.26  For the President to continue nonenforcement in the face of 
the Court’s declaring his constitutional interpretation wrong would not 
 
 22. See id. at 1192–96.  Although I am generally sympathetic with Professor Prakash’s 
arguments for departmentalism, his insistence that the presidential oath and the Take Care 
Clause require the President to refrain from enforcing laws the President deems 
unconstitutional, see supra notes 17–18, is just as problematic as the opposing view, i.e., that 
the oath and the Take Care Clause require deference to Congress and the courts.  Whether 
faithful execution requires deference, independence, or something in between, cannot be 
answered by the language of the presidential oath or the Take Care Clause.  Structural 
arguments, and arguments from applied political-constitutional theory, are needed. 
 23. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 6, at 536–37; Prakash, supra note 14, at 1633–35; 
see also Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 9, ¶ 7. 
 24. Prakash, supra note 14, at 1616. See generally Devins & Prakash, supra note 6. 
 25. See Barron, supra note 20, at 90, 92; Johnsen, supra note 7, at 17; Dawn E. Johnsen, 
What’s a President to Do?  Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration 
Abuses, 88 B.U. L. REV. 395, 412 (2008); Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, supra note 
9, ¶¶ 3–4. 
 26. See GREENE, supra note 13, at 54, 215, 217, 228–32. 
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strictly speaking constitute defying a court order, but neither should we 
consider it merely disregard of precedent.  The President should not 
continue his constitutionally based nonenforcement unless he has very good 
reasons to countermand the Court.  What factors a President should 
consider is something I’ll leave for another day. 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL STANDING 
Had President Obama stuck to his interpretive guns and stopped 
enforcing section 3 of DOMA, legally married same-sex couples would 
receive federal benefits that legally married opposite-sex couples receive.  
There would be no classically injured private party; with an (increasingly 
narrow) Establishment Clause exception,27 arguably illegal expenditure of 
federal funds does not usually ground standing in citizens or taxpayers.  But 
in this scenario, the President is treating a properly enacted law as if it were 
no law at all.  (This isn’t simply a matter of enforcement discretion.)  That 
action arguably injures the United States of America as a public corporate 
entity, and it arguably injures Congress, as the body that passed the law.  
(Whether with or without a presidential signature should not matter.)  After 
all, if, for example, a state court invalidates a federal statute as 
unconstitutional, the United States, through the DOJ, may appeal that 
ruling, all the way up to the U.S. Supreme Court.28  There, the DOJ is 
representing the United States, as a party injured by the state court ruling.  
When such a case reaches the Supreme Court, there have to be properly 
adverse parties to ground Article III standing, and the U.S., seeking to un-
nullify its law, is such a party.  If the President in effect nullifies a federal 
law by refusing to enforce it on constitutional grounds, things are no 
different than if a court declares a federal law unconstitutional.  In both 
settings, the United States as a governmental body is harmed and should be 
allowed to seek judicial review in federal court.  Since the President (and 
his DOJ) are unavailable to defend the constitutionality of a statute the 
President has decided neither to enforce nor to defend, it makes sense to 
permit Congress to seek a declaratory judgment as to the statute’s 
constitutionality.  Congress gets to represent the United States, to defend 
the constitutionality of a law it has passed, and to involve the third branch, 
the judiciary, in the constitutional determination.  There are procedural 
complexities I’ll cover in Part IV—who precisely is suing, on behalf of 
whom, and with what authorization.  Until then, assume that Congress is 
suing, on behalf of either the United States or itself, with appropriate 
authorization. 
 
 27. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968). But see Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition 
Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 
587 (2007); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 
454 U.S. 464 (1982). 
 28. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 517 (“Interest of United States in pending suits.”). 
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The leading case about congressional standing is Raines v. Byrd,29 and it 
distinguishes another important case, about state legislative standing, 
Coleman v. Miller.30  In Raines, a group of U.S. Congresspersons sued in 
federal court to invalidate the Line Item Veto Act, claiming that the Act 
improperly aggrandized presidential power.31  The Court threw the case 
out, on standing grounds.32  Plaintiffs’ claim, said the Court, “is that the Act 
causes a type of institutional injury (the diminution of legislative power), 
which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and both Houses of 
Congress equally . . . .  [Plaintiffs] do not claim that they have been 
deprived of something to which they personally are entitled . . . .”33  There 
are three separate ideas embedded in this passage:  first, that diminution of 
legislative power is insufficient injury for Article III standing; second, that 
members of Congress may not sue in federal court in their official capacity; 
third, that whatever injury is present is too widely shared, and not specific 
enough. 
The first ends up being most important, because of how the Court treats 
Coleman.  There, the Kansas State Senate deadlocked 20–20 on a federal 
constitutional amendment, and the Lieutenant Governor cast a tie-breaking 
vote in favor (and the State House voted yes).34  Plaintiffs, in state court, 
were the 20 state senators who had voted no;35 one of their merits 
arguments was that Article V of the U.S. Constitution grants amendment-
ratifying power to state legislatures, which may not include the state 
executive.  If they were right on this merits point, the amendment should 
have been defeated in Kansas, rather than approved.  Coleman permitted the 
state senate plaintiffs, who had lost in state court, to perfect an appeal to the 
Supreme Court: 
Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose votes against 
ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if 
they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient 
to defeat ratification.  We think that these senators have a plain, direct and 
adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes.36 
 
 29. 521 U.S. 811 (1997). 
 30. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). 
 31. Raines, 521 U.S. at 811.  This is a claim with which the Court later agreed, once it 
could identify some properly injured parties. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 
(1998). 
 32. Raines, 521 U.S. at 811. 
 33. Id. at 821 (emphasis omitted). 
 34. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435–36. 
 35. Id. at 436. 
 36. Id. at 438.  In Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), the Court held 
that if a state court plaintiff lacks what would be sufficient federal court standing, merely 
losing in the state courts cannot supply the injury necessary to bring an appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Id. at 434–35.  Judge Bork suggested that after Doremus, Coleman might no 
longer be good law. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 63 n.16 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., 
dissenting), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) 
(mootness).  But this isn’t right; the state legislator plaintiffs in Coleman did allege standing 
specific to themselves—that their votes were nullified by the Lieutenant Governor’s 
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Raines confirmed Coleman’s validity: 
[O]ur holding in Coleman stands . . . for the proposition that legislators 
whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific 
legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into 
effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been 
completely nullified.37 
In other words, “[t]here is a vast difference between the level of vote 
nullification at issue in Coleman and the abstract dilution of institutional 
legislative power that is alleged here.”38  The argument for legislative 
standing, thus, is not that the law in question arguably impinges on 
legislative power or improperly adds to executive power.  Rather, the 
argument is that legislators have standing to make sure that laws don’t 
become non-laws, and to make sure that non-laws don’t become laws.39 
When the President declares that he won’t enforce a federal statute 
because he deems it unconstitutional, he has completely nullified the votes 
of those in favor of the law, and arguably under Coleman any one or more 
of those who voted for the law may sue to set aside the President’s 
nonenforcement decision.  After canvassing some lower court cases on both 
the Raines and Coleman sides of the ledger, I’ll discuss some serious 
separation of powers arguments against legislative standing.  One 
conclusion is that we might indeed be wary of permitting individual federal 
legislators, or groups of such, to claim sufficient injury, but that if we see 
presidential nullification of a statute in a different light, we can see that it 
injures the United States or Congress, or perhaps either house, as an 
institution. 
Several post-Raines cases fall on the Raines side of the ledger.  In Russell 
v. DeJongh,40 a Virgin Islands senator sued to set aside judicial 
commissions, claiming that the governor had failed to follow proper 
procedure.  The Third Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing: 
 The courts have drawn a distinction . . . between a public official’s 
mere disobedience of a law for which a legislator voted—which is not an 
 
improper action.  If we accept this claim of legislative injury (as Coleman did and as Raines 
reaffirms), there’s no Doremus problem. See id. at 28 n.15 (Coleman plaintiffs had injury 
cognizable for federal standing purposes). 
 Note that the principal opinion in Coleman is for three Justices only; they concluded that 
plaintiffs had standing and that the case should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political 
question. See Coleman, 307 U.S. at 450.  Four other Justices thought there was no standing, 
but agreed with the plurality that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question, 
although on somewhat different reasoning. See id. at 457–58 (Black, J., concurring).  The 
remaining two Justices went straight to a merits issue, concluding that too much time had 
elapsed since the constitutional amendment in question had been initially proposed, and thus 
that Kansas’ purported ratification came too late. See id. at 471–72 (Butler, J., dissenting).  
To reach the merits, these two Justices must have believed standing was present. 
 37. Raines, 521 U.S. at 823. 
 38. Id. at 826. 
 39. For “law” we can substitute “legislative action” to cover the unusual nature of what 
was at stake in Coleman. 
 40. 491 F.3d 130 (3d Cir. 2007). 
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injury in fact—and an official’s “distortion of the process by which a bill 
becomes law” by nullifying a legislator’s vote or depriving a legislator of 
an opportunity to vote—which is an injury in fact.41 
One aspect of the reasoning was that the legislature could still have voted 
down the judges; this will be relevant to the upcoming separation of powers 
discussion and to the question whether and to what extent legislative self-
help opportunities should affect legislative standing analysis. 
In Chenoweth v. Clinton,42 some House members sued to enjoin 
implementation of a program instituted by President Clinton, arguing that it 
exceeded his constitutional and statutory authority.  The D.C. Circuit held 
there was no standing: 
If, as the Court held in Raines, a statute that allegedly “divests 
[congressmen] of their constitutional role” in the legislative process does 
not give them standing to sue, . . . then neither does an Executive Order 
that allegedly deprives congressmen of their “right[] to participate and 
vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution.”43 
Purported executive aggrandizement is insufficient for legislative standing 
and there was no claim that President Clinton had either nullified a valid 
law or treated as valid law something that was not so. 
In Campbell v. Clinton,44 “[a] number of congressmen, led by Tom 
Campbell of California, filed suit claiming that the President violated the 
War Powers Resolution and the War Powers Clause of the Constitution by 
directing U.S. forces’ participation in the recent NATO campaign in 
Yugoslavia.”45  Again, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the case for lack of 
standing.46  Although the court focused on whether the legislators had self-
help available against the President (they did, said the court), it also more 
simply concluded that this was a Raines and not a Coleman case because 
President Clinton didn’t arguably nullify valid law, or the opposite. 
Finally, in Daughtrey v. Carter,47 a pre-Raines case, two 
Congresspersons sued, arguing that President Carter’s pardoning of 
Vietnam War draft evaders violated immigration and other laws.48  On 
various grounds, the D.C. Circuit held there was no standing.49  The main 
point was that the Congresspersons shared an interest that all citizens have 
in presidential enforcement of the law, and thus stated a generalized 
grievance, insufficient for standing.  We may distinguish Daughtrey from 
the present hypothetical case—a potential lawsuit against President Obama 
for failure to enforce DOMA section 3—in several ways:  Daughtrey 
 
 41. Id. at 135. 
 42. 181 F.3d 112 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012 (2000). 
 43. Id. at 115 (alterations in original). 
 44. 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 815 (2000). 
 45. Id. at 19. 
 46. Id. at 24. 
 47. 584 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
 48. Id. at 1053. 
 49. Id. at 1058. 
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involved the pardon power, arguably plenary in the President and 
nonreviewable (making it a nonjusticiable political question case); I’m 
trying to develop an argument for Congress’ suing, not for individual 
members’ suing; and Daughtrey did not involve nonenforcement on the 
ground that the President deemed a particular law unconstitutional. 
Two post-Raines cases, and one decided before Raines, are properly 
sorted with Coleman.  All three were “pocket veto” cases, i.e., each raised 
the merits question whether executive inaction resulted in a bill becoming a 
law.  Here’s Article I, Section 7 of the U.S. Constitution on the subject: 
If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days 
(Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same 
shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress 
by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a 
Law.50 
In Kennedy v. Sampson,51 Congress passed a bill and sent it to President 
Nixon.52  Congress adjourned eight days after the bill was passed, but the 
Senate authorized an agent to receive presidential messages during the 
adjournment.53  On the tenth day after the bill was passed, the President 
indicated he would not sign the bill, but did not formally veto it54 (i.e., did 
not “return” the bill to Congress).  Senator Edward M. Kennedy, who had 
voted for the bill, sued two federal officials, seeking a judicial declaration 
that the bill had become a law and an order that it be published as such.  
The D.C. Circuit held that Kennedy had standing: 
In the present case, appellee has alleged that conduct by officials of the 
executive branch amounted to an illegal nullification not only of 
Congress’ exercise of its power, but also of appellee’s exercise of his 
power.  In the language of the Coleman opinion, appellee’s object in this 
lawsuit is to vindicate the effectiveness of his vote.  No more essential 
interest could be asserted by a legislator.  We are satisfied, therefore, that 
the purposes of the standing doctrine are fully served in this litigation.55 
This makes sense; if plaintiff is correct on the merits,56 then the officials’ 
refusal to treat the bill as law nullified an otherwise valid law, and, 
following Coleman, as a member of the body that had voted for the law, 
plaintiff had standing to protect the validity of his vote.57  (Recall that in 
Coleman plaintiffs alleged the obverse—that their votes, collectively, 
 
 50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 51. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 52. Id. at 432. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 436. 
 56. On the merits, the court held that because Congress had made arrangements to 
receive a presidential veto during its adjournment, the President had not pocket vetoed the 
bill, and thus it became law. See id. at 436–42. 
 57. Post-Raines, Chenoweth confirmed this understanding of Kennedy as still good law. 
See Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 116–17 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 
1012 (2000). 
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resulted in no-law but that defendants were treating the matter otherwise.)  
Again, whether an individual legislator (or legislators) is the proper plaintiff 
in such a case, as opposed to the body itself, is a difficult question that I 
shall address below. 
In Barnes v. Kline,58 plaintiffs were the Senate, the Speaker of the House, 
the bipartisan leadership of the House, and members of the House.  The 
merits issue was similar to that in Kennedy—whether congressional 
adjournment prevented return of a bill from the President, thus rendering 
his inaction a pocket veto, or whether congressional authorization of agents 
to receive a presidential veto meant that the bill became law when the 
President failed to act.59  The intervening Raines case notwithstanding, the 
court followed Kennedy and held that legislative standing was appropriate.  
After all, in upholding standing for an individual legislator, the Kennedy 
court had indicated: 
[T]hat either house of Congress clearly would have had standing to 
challenge the injury to its participation in the lawmaking process, since it 
is the Senate and the House of Representatives that pass legislation under 
Article I, and [alleged] improper exercise of the pocket veto power 
infringes that right more directly than it does the right of individual 
members to vote on proposed legislation.60 
Finally, in Gutierrez v. Pangelinan,61 the Governor of Guam neither 
signed nor vetoed a bill, but rather returned it to the legislature with a 
memorandum stating his understanding that the bill would become law 
without his signature.  Two legislators who had voted against the bill sued 
in Guam court for a declaration that the bill had not become a law, but 
rather that the Governor had pocket vetoed the law.62  The lower court ruled 
for the Governor, but the Guam high court reversed, holding that the 
Governor had pocket vetoed the bill.63  As authorized by federal law, the 
Governor appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which held that he had appellate 
standing: 
 For purposes of standing, Governor Gutierrez’s position in this 
litigation is analogous to that of the senators in Coleman.  He argues that 
§ 1423i granted the Governor the power to allow Bill 495 to pass into law 
by neither signing nor vetoing it.  The Guam Supreme Court’s ruling, 
however, had the opposite effect:  the Governor’s inaction, in light of the 
legislature’s failure to adopt appropriate procedures for receipt of the bill 
 
 58. 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 
479 U.S. 361 (1987) (mootness). 
 59. The court resolved the merits issue as it had in Kennedy, holding that by authorizing 
agents to accept a presidential veto, Congress had (essentially) eliminated the possibility of a 
pocket veto during an adjournment. See id. at 30–41.  The court refused to distinguish 
between the intrasession adjournment in Kennedy and the intersession adjournment here. Id. 
at 40. 
 60. Id. at 26. 
 61. 276 F.3d 539 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 825 (2002). 
 62. Id. at 543. 
 63. Id. at 543–44. 
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from the Governor, resulted in a pocket veto of Bill 495.  Under Coleman 
and Raines, the nullification of Governor Gutierrez’s asserted prerogative 
establishes his standing.64 
The Ninth Circuit also said, as an aside, “[i]t is doubtful that Plaintiffs 
would have had standing to seek relief in federal court at the outset of this 
case.”65  This seems wrong.  Under Coleman, and consistent with Kennedy 
and Barnes, the legislators would have had standing to seek a declaration 
that what the Governor deemed to be a law was in fact no-law.66 
Thus, from the case law there’s a fairly straightforward argument to treat 
a presidential decision not to enforce a statute, because he deems the statute 
unconstitutional, as a Coleman-type case.  The injury to the legislature (or 
legislators; I’m finessing that distinction for the moment) isn’t just that the 
President has arguably aggrandized his power or diluted legislative power.  
Rather, it’s a more fundamental concern with legal validity—the President 
has arguably treated valid law as if it were invalid law.  There’s one 
possible stumbling point here.  Raines approves legislative standing from 
Coleman if an arguably valid law “does not go into effect.”67  In the type of 
case I’m discussing, the law formally goes into effect—and then it becomes 
ineffectual because of presidential nonenforcement on constitutional 
grounds.  How does Clinton v. City of New York68 affect this analysis?  
There, the Court held unconstitutional the Line Item Veto Act (LIVA), 
which gave the President the power to cancel spending items in laws that 
had been enacted through proper Article I, Section 7 process.69  Such 
cancellation prevented the item “‘from having legal force or effect.’”70  The 
Court’s reasoning was not elaborate:  To make a law, or to repeal a law, a 
bill must go through bicameralism and presentment (and then possible veto 
override).  For Congress to give the President power to cancel a spending 
item and thereby prevent it from having legal force or effect is to skirt the 
constitutionally mandated process for repealing legislation.  In 
distinguishing presidential enforcement discretion and discretionary 
spending power, the Court held that the LIVA was special because it alone 
 
 64. Id. at 546.  On the merits, the court agreed with plaintiffs that the bill had not 
properly become law. See id. at 547–49. 
 65. Id. at 544. 
 66. If I were relying on Coleman to develop a case for the standing of individual 
legislators, then the pocket veto cases might not strictly speaking fit, because in none of 
those cases was the entire bloc of legislators who voted for a bill suing, nor would such be a 
perfect analogy, because Coleman involved a necessary bloc of half the legislators for the 
unusual tie type case to arise. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text for a discussion 
of Coleman.  But I am relying on Coleman more generally for its concern with the action of 
an elected official—there, the Lieutenant Governor’s “no” vote—that nullifies a purportedly 
legitimate legislative act.  And I am developing an argument for institutional standing, not 
for the standing of individual legislators. 
 67. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 823 (1997). 
 68. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
 69. Id. at 421. 
 70. Id. at 437 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 691e(4)(B)–(C) (2006)). 
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“gives the President the unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted 
statutes.”71 
The scenario with which I’m concerned does not involve a statute giving 
the President unilateral power to change the text of duly enacted statutes, 
nor does it involve his grabbing such power.  Thus, perhaps one could argue 
that presidential refusal to enforce a law—because he deems it 
unconstitutional—is unproblematic in the way that the Clinton dicta 
suggests executive enforcement and spending decisions may be 
unproblematic.  I resist this claim, though, for two reasons (apart from the 
fact that I’m discussing Clinton dicta and that Clinton did not consider a 
case such as the one I’m discussing).  First, although we might normally 
think that presidential enforcement and spending decisions are noninjurious 
(in and of themselves, as opposed to specific persons who might be 
injured), a decision not to enforce a statute on constitutional grounds is 
different.  It is tantamount to nullifying the statute.  It renders law non-law.  
Arguably this injures the body politic generally and Congress specifically.  
Second, the discussion in Clinton is about the constitutionality of Congress’ 
giving the President a certain type of power (and we could extend the 
reasoning to a situation in which the President himself sought to grab such 
power).  The issue I’m treating is the threshold one of standing, of what 
counts as sufficient injury for a federal court to reach the merits.  Even if 
presidential nonenforcement on constitutional grounds doesn’t amount to 
changing the text of duly enacted statutes (i.e., rendering them formally 
without legal effect), it arguably counts as nullifying legislative votes in the 
Coleman way, sufficient for standing. 
III.  SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST CONGRESSIONAL STANDING, 
AND RESPONSES 
In two D.C. Circuit cases,72 Judge Bork and then-Judge Scalia argued 
against congressional standing.  Their arguments, plus those of some 
scholars, offer various reasons grounded in separation of powers to resist 
permitting members of Congress (and perhaps Congress as an institution) to 
sue in federal court to challenge presidential action or inaction.  I first 
summarize these arguments, and then attempt to rebut them. 
First, as Judge Bork maintained, “except where a conventional lawsuit 
requires a judicial resolution, much of the allocation of powers is best left to 
political struggle and compromise . . . .  Moreover, I know of no grave 
consequences for our constitutional system that have flowed from political 
struggles between Congress and the President.”73  Similarly, then-Judge 
Scalia wrote:  “we sit here neither to supervise the internal workings of the 
executive and legislative branches nor to umpire disputes between those 
 
 71. Id. at 447. 
 72. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (Barnes); infra note 74 and 
accompanying text (Moore). 
 73. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), vacated on 
other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (mootness). 
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branches regarding their respective powers.”74  D.C. Circuit Judge 
McGowan, although open in principle to congressional standing, 
nonetheless invoked a cognate idea when he suggested the court could 
dismiss cases on a theory of equitable (or remedial) discretion, focusing on 
whether Congress has self-help mechanisms to battle the President.75 
Second, perhaps the President’s power to take care that the laws are 
faithfully executed, and perhaps part of his executive power more broadly, 
involve making determinations regarding the constitutionality of legislation, 
at various stages, including both the veto and enforcement.  On this view, in 
the kind of situation I am discussing, permitting anyone but a classically 
injured private party to sue improperly gives Congress or Congresspersons, 
with the assistance of the courts, the power to execute and enforce the 
law.76  This is similar to one of the arguments Justice Scalia offered in 
rejecting citizen suits in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife.77  Another aspect of 
this second point is that if Congress sues to enforce the law, it is taking on 
an executive function, perhaps unconstitutionally, as per cases such as 
Bowsher v. Synar.78 
Third, perhaps the simplest separation of powers argument against 
legislative standing, at least when we’re considering various forms of 
claims against the executive, is that legislators are suing in their official 
capacity as representatives of citizens, for an injury that is shared by all 
those represented.79  Following a line of Supreme Court holdings,80 this sort 
of case should accordingly be dismissed as a generalized grievance, 
insufficient to support standing.  In other words, perhaps such lawsuits lack 
the concrete adversariness that is the hallmark of the Court’s Article III case 
or controversy jurisprudence. 
I will respond to the first two points together.  First, I am arguing for 
congressional standing only in cases that may reasonably be seen as on the 
Coleman side of the Coleman-Raines divide.  Specifically, I am making a 
case only for congressional standing to seek a judicial declaration in 
 
 74. Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, 
J., concurring in the result), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 
U.S. 811, 832–35 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); Anthony Clark Arend & 
Catherine B. Lotrionte, Congress Goes to Court:  The Past, Present, and Future of 
Legislator Standing, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 277–81 (2001); Barron, supra note 
20, at 99–100. 
 75. See Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court:  The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV. 
241, 244 (1981). 
 76. See Matthew I. Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1539, 1567–69 (2012). 
 77. 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992). 
 78. 478 U.S. 714 (1986). 
 79. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 48–51 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting), 
vacated on other grounds sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987) (mootness); cf. 
Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2350 (2011) (“The legislative power 
thus committed is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people; the legislator has 
no personal right to it.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); 
United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). 
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response to a stated presidential decision not to enforce a statute he deems 
unconstitutional.  I am not arguing for congressional standing in the bevy of 
other types of disputes that might arise between Congress and the President.  
Thus, I can accept arguendo whatever weight there is to the Bork-Scalia 
argument in favor of letting the political branches duke it out, except in 
Coleman-type cases. 
Second, as Carlin Meyer argues, forcing Congress to combat presidential 
constitutional nonenforcement outside the courts is costly, and arguably 
shifts the burden of action in a constitutionally inappropriate direction.81  
After all, in the kind of case with which we’re concerned, Congress has 
already surmounted the difficult bicameralism and presentment process, 
only to find a President asserting an ex-post executive check on properly 
enacted legislation.  Congress could begin impeachment proceedings, or try 
to tie the President’s hands in other ways, but these are costly and complex 
and, more to the point, not directly responsive to the matter at hand.  Why 
not get all three branches into the mix? 
Third, although generally speaking the legislature legislates, the 
executive executes, and the judiciary judges, the federal government’s 
system of divided powers is more complex than that.  The legislature also 
impeaches and convicts, and confirms or rejects nominees; the executive 
also signs or vetoes legislation; the judiciary also often departs from a 
purely case-deciding function, interpreting law in many strictly unnecessary 
ways, such as when it issues dicta, alternative holdings, or, as the Court 
recently announced permissible, hears appeals from prevailing parties 
because of the possible precedential effect of lower court rulings.82  Further, 
all three branches, including the executive, properly interpret the 
Constitution in the kind of situation with which we’re concerned.  Allowing 
Congress to step in as enforcer of the law—in a limited way, by asking for a 
judicial declaration of constitutionality—makes sense in a system of 
divided but also hybrid powers, which permits the President effectively to 
nullify a law by deeming it unconstitutional.  If we’re going to follow 
departmentalism to the end of presidential constitutional nonenforcement—
as I’ve suggested we should, to save private parties from harm and to save 
the President from interpretive schizophrenia—then we should see law 
enforcement as, occasionally, multi-branch in nature as well. 
Bowsher is not to the contrary.  Congress had enacted a complex scheme 
to balance the budget, delegating significant policymaking power to the 
Comptroller General, who was removable by joint resolution of Congress 
only (i.e., through bicameralism and presentment).83  The majority viewed 
the Comptroller General’s delegated power as executive, and found it 
unconstitutional for Congress to have removal power, even with 
 
 81. See Carlin Meyer, Imbalance of Powers:  Can Congressional Lawsuits Serve As 
Counterweight?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 84–93 (1992); see also Amanda Frost, Congress in 
Court, 59 UCLA L. REV. 914, 960–62 (2012). 
 82. See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
 83. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 717–19, 727–28 (1986). 
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presentment, in such a situation:  “Congress in effect has retained control 
over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the executive function.  
The Constitution does not permit such intrusion.”84  Concurring in the 
judgment, Justice Stevens concluded that the Comptroller General was an 
agent of Congress (not only because of its removal power), that he 
exercised policymaking power, and that: 
Congress may not exercise its fundamental power to formulate national 
policy by delegating that power to one of its two Houses, to a legislative 
committee, or to an individual agent of the Congress such as the Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate, or 
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office.  That principle, I 
believe, is applicable to the Comptroller General.85 
On Justice Stevens’ logic, there would be no Bowsher problem were 
Congress to sue the President in cases of presidential constitutional 
nonenforcement, because Congress isn’t making policy in so doing, nor is a 
subset of Congress doing so were the House or Senate alone to sue.  On the 
majority’s logic, things are a bit closer, because Congress’ suing the 
President may be deemed taking over an executive function; generally it is 
the President through the DOJ who litigates to support the constitutionality 
of federal law (more on this below).  But Congress is not here controlling 
the execution of law.  And the President, after all, has expressly abdicated 
his law enforcement function, so Congress may be seen, in this limited type 
of case, as stepping into a power vacuum.  It’s just another instance of 
mixing and mingling of powers, acceptable to ensure a proper balance of 
power and a three-branch solution.86 
Fourth, we should reject the Scalia-esque argument that placing 
execution of the law outside of the President’s control violates either the 
Take Care Clause or the vesting of executive power in “a President of the 
United States of America.”87  This was a phony argument in Lujan.88  The 
citizen-suit provision there was unconstitutional because it sought to permit 
as plaintiffs in federal court anyone with an argument that a federal agency 
had violated the law, without a specific claim of harm.  This is an Article III 
problem, violating our conception of a case or controversy.89  It is not 
otherwise inappropriate for Congress to create new statutory rights and 
enable a potentially vast array of citizens to seek relief in federal court 
when they believe an agency has not properly executed the law and when 
they can assert harm specific to themselves.  That the Court upheld 
 
 84. Id. at 734. 
 85. Id. at 737 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 
919 (1983)). 
 86. On the virtues of multi-branch solutions, see Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets 
Youngstown:  National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. 
 88. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 89. See id. at 573–78, 580–81 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the 
judgment). 
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independent agencies in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States90 and 
Morrison v. Olson91 is further evidence that Congress may alienate 
executive power from the President, albeit with limits.  If we properly see 
Congress as injured in an instance of presidential constitutional 
nonenforcement, or properly speaking on behalf of an injured United States, 
then it is not similar to a citizen-suit plaintiff; rather, it has taken over law 
execution power only after the President has refused to exercise such 
power, it is acting in a limited type of case, and it is doing so consistent 
with an understanding of nonplenary executive power in the President. 
I also reject the claim that a congressional suit against the President for 
constitutionally based nonenforcement is no more than a generalized 
grievance.  I’m not sure, however, whether individual Congresspersons (or 
groups of Congresspersons) should have standing to sue here.  They do 
under Coleman, as I have suggested, under the theory that their votes are 
nullified by constitutional, categorical nonenforcement.  But Coleman itself 
is an unusual case, about whether the legislature itself ratified or failed to 
ratify a constitutional amendment.92  There, the legislative body could not 
have been an appropriate plaintiff.  In the pocket veto cases, and in the kind 
of case I’m discussing, we can clearly see the legislature pitted against the 
executive, claiming a kind of nullification of valid law, or the obverse.  In 
such cases, the argument that individual legislators merely act as 
representatives of their constituents, and don’t have a separate cognizable 
interest in the enforcement of laws, at least not in federal court, is a 
powerful one.  Rather than attempt to overcome that, I would rather turn to 
what seems an easier and more obvious route for standing, namely, 
permitting Congress itself to sue.  Whether this means Congress as a body 
or either house as a body, we could see Congress as itself injured when the 
President says, “that thing you passed that we all agree is a law that I’m 
supposed to enforce?  I’m going to treat it as a nullity.”  Alternatively, we 
could see Congress as speaking on behalf of the United States, seeking a 
judicial determination of the law’s validity, just as the DOJ routinely does 
when courts around the country challenge or invalidate federal law. 
It’s worth addressing three knotty issues here.  First, if Congress is suing 
on its own behalf rather than on behalf of the United States, may either 
house sue separately, or must they sue together?  Second, the Congress that 
enacts a law, such as DOMA, will often not be the same Congress that sues 
the President who isn’t enforcing the law.  Who is injured here?  Third, 
such nonenforcement may be seen as temporary.  After all, the current 
President or a future President could reverse course and decide to enforce 
the law.  Is there really injury from the current moment of nonenforcement? 
As to the first issue, the Constitution constitutes each house as a separate 
body, gives each some separate responsibilities, and requires each 
 
 90. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 91. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 92. See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text. 
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separately to pass a bill to enact it into law (and to override a presidential 
veto).  Thus, it’s plausible to think of each house as separately injured when 
a bill it has played a necessary (though not sufficient) role in passing is 
nullified by the President.  If the insufficiency of either house’s vote is 
troubling in thinking about injury, then we could move to the model of 
suing on behalf of the United States or on behalf of the Congress as a 
whole. 
As to the second issue, if we properly see Congress as injured by the type 
of presidential nonenforcement I’m discussing, then we should understand 
the institution as injured, not individual legislators.  And the institution is a 
continuing one.  Think of Hart’s elegant depersonalization of a legal system 
when he discusses “the continuity of the authority to make law” and the 
“persistence of laws long after their maker and those who rendered him 
habitual obedience have perished.”93  Thus, Congress (and perhaps either 
house) as an institution has an ongoing interest in its laws being treated as 
at least presumptively valid and worthy of enforcement by the President. 
As to the third issue, although presidential nonenforcement on 
constitutional grounds may be altered by a sitting or future President, if one 
otherwise accepts the idea of the United States or Congress as injured from 
such nonenforcement, then it’s not clear why the only remedial option 
should be to wait it out (and perhaps cajole the President, now or later, to 
change course).  Judicial precedent is also changeable, but if, for example, a 
circuit court strikes down a federal law, we permit the United States via the 
DOJ to appeal the matter.  We don’t say, “maybe you could convince the 
circuit in the next case to take another look at the issue.”  Although we 
might sometimes think of judicial precedent as more impervious to change, 
we should think of injury to the United States, or to Congress or either 
house, as ongoing when either a court or the President treats a valid law as 
if it were invalid on constitutional grounds. 
What about concrete adversariness?  We don’t have to worry about the 
adversariness piece—this is not Joe Blow waking up in the morning, 
reading about some agency action he thinks is illegal, and suing.  That is, 
it’s not a citizen suit.  Congress is directly harmed when its laws are treated 
as non-laws and has every reason to be a vigorous adversary to defend its 
turf. 
The concreteness piece is harder.94  When the President enforces DOMA 
section 3, injured same-sex couples can sue, and the facts of their cases 
provide standard concreteness—specific facts from specific injured persons.  
If the President were not to enforce DOMA section 3, then legally married 
same-sex couples would get appropriate federal benefits, and were 
Congress to sue, it wouldn’t be to take away specific benefits from specific 
couples.  So we wouldn’t have the standard sort of concreteness the Court 
says Article III adjudication requires.  But we would have many real-world 
 
 93. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 51 (2d ed. 1994). 
 94. See Hall, supra note 76, at 1570. 
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examples of how the President’s nonenforcement policy operates.  It would 
be easy enough to find records of specific federal benefits going to specific 
legally married same-sex couples, and the Congress vs. President litigation 
could rely on such examples.  Concreteness operates as a proxy for 
adversariness, which would be present here.  It also operates to ensure 
focused rather than abstract adjudication, which would be compromised 
here, but because of the examples of legally married same-sex couples’ 
receiving benefits under a presidential policy of not enforcing DOMA 
section 3 on constitutional grounds, it would be only somewhat 
compromised.  The latter is not all that different from how facts would be 
presented in a declaratory judgment action by members of a same-sex 
couple deciding whether to get married in a state that permits it, and 
wanting to know whether they would or would not receive certain federal 
benefits, in a setting in which the answer to that question would affect their 
decision to get married. 
IV.  PRACTICAL QUESTIONS ABOUT IMPLEMENTING 
CONGRESSIONAL STANDING 
Finally, I turn to practical questions about implementing congressional 
standing to sue when the President engages in nonenforcement because he 
believes a law is unconstitutional.95  Ideally, Congress would sue on behalf 
of the United States, stepping into the shoes the executive (via the DOJ) 
usually fills.  A federal statute seems to set parameters on who may speak 
for the United States in this way, however.  28 U.S.C. § 516 is titled 
“Conduct of litigation reserved to Department of Justice,” and it provides:  
“Except as otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which 
the United States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, 
and securing evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of 
Justice, under the direction of the Attorney General.”96  And although 28 
U.S.C. § 530D requires the Attorney General to notify Congress when DOJ 
is engaging in constitutionally based nonenforcement,97 neither it nor any 
other federal statute authorizes Congress, or either house, to litigate on 
behalf of the United States.98  Provisions of 2 U.S.C. § 288 establish the 
 
 95. Professor Meltzer argues against the solution I recommend because (a) as plaintiff, 
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would decide cases on the merits, and not on who’s arguing them.  Regarding (c), I agree 
with Meltzer, and thus there will be occasions in which majorities in both houses will agree 
with the President and not sue to set aside nonenforcement. 
 96. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (2006). 
 97. Id. § 530D(a)(1). 
 98. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. 
Supp. 51, 56 n.8 (D.D.C. 1973). 
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Office of Senate Legal Counsel, and among other things authorize the 
Counsel to appear in court on behalf of the Senate, as intervenor or amicus 
curiae, to defend the Senate’s or Congress’ constitutional prerogatives.99  
The statute provides that intervention is permissible only if constitutional 
standing is also present.100  Under this law, the Counsel could properly 
appear on behalf of the Senate to defend a law the President had elected not 
to defend—we should see Congress as injured in such instances, as argued 
above.101  But the law neither authorizes the Counsel to appear on behalf of 
the United States nor grants it power to sue as a plaintiff, even if only on 
behalf of the Senate or Congress. 
There’s no parallel statute for House Counsel.  2 U.S.C. § 130f describes 
some matters relating to the House General Counsel not relevant here, and 
states that the term “General Counsel of the House of Representatives” 
means “the head of the Office of General Counsel established and operating 
under clause 8 of rule II of the Rules of the House of Representatives.”102  
That Rule dictates some procedures for directing the Counsel, but otherwise 
just states that the Counsel’s purpose is to “provid[e] legal assistance and 
representation to the House.”103  That, too, doesn’t satisfy § 516’s 
requirement that litigation in which the United States is “interested”—
which I am reading as coterminous with “on behalf of the United States”—
be “authorized by law” if done outside of the DOJ. 
Congress could pass a statute authorizing the Senate or House Counsel, 
or counsel representing both houses jointly, to litigate—as plaintiff or 
defendant-intervenor—on behalf of the United States when the President 
asserts he will not enforce a statute because he believes the statute is 
unconstitutional.  There are several roughly parallel examples of federal 
courts permitting legislators or legislative bodies, or other persons, to 
appear on behalf of states.104  If one agrees that Congress, or either house, 
 
 99. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 288, 288b(c), 288e(a) (2006). 
 100. See id. § 288e(a). 
 101. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2002), is not to the contrary.  
There, the Ninth Circuit denied intervention to the Senate to defend the constitutionality of 
the federally authorized pledge of allegiance.  The DOJ was also defending the law, and the 
Ninth Circuit didn’t think the Senate alleged Article III injury, a predicate to intervention 
under § 288e (a).  My contention in the text is that the Senate (or Congress) is injured when 
the President, on constitutional grounds, categorically refuses to enforce a properly enacted 
law. 
 102. 2 U.S.C. § 130f(c)(1). 
 103. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 112TH CONG., R. II(8) (2011), available 
at http://clerk.house.gov/legislative/house-rules.pdf.  For a discussion of Senate and House 
Counsel, see Frost, supra note 81, at 942–45. 
 104. See, e.g., Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72, 82 (1987) (“New Jersey Legislature had 
authority under state law to represent the State’s interests in both the District Court and the 
Court of Appeals . . . .”); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1064–74 (9th Cir. 2012) 
(California law authorizes supporters of a proposition to defend it on appeal, speaking for the 
state when the state’s elected leaders refuse to do so); Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 
181 F.3d 1333, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (state legislative council not authorized to sue on 
behalf of the state; inference that it would be acceptable party if so authorized); Planned 
Parenthood of Mid-Mo. & E. Kan., Inc. v. Ehlmann, 137 F.3d 573, 578 (8th Cir. 1998) 
(“legislators may obtain standing to defend the constitutionality of a legislative enactment 
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has Article III standing in the kind of case we’re discussing, federal law 
authorization of Congress to appear on behalf of the United States should 
work as well. 
What if Congress, or either house, were to appear on its own behalf, 
rather than on behalf of the United States?  As I’ve argued, standing should 
be available here, and then the question is whether such appearances have 
been authorized by law.  The provisions that establish the Senate Counsel 
also authorize intervention, when approved by Senate Resolution.105  Those 
provisions do not speak to Senate Counsel’s power to sue, so perhaps they 
would have to be amended to so provide.  Or perhaps not.  Nothing in 
federal law precludes the Senate or its Counsel from appearing on behalf of 
Congress, or the Senate, as plaintiff.  Thus, perhaps a concurrent resolution 
of Congress (majority vote in both houses, without presentment), or simply 
a Senate resolution, would suffice to authorize Senate Counsel to sue on 
behalf of Congress or the Senate.  The relevant House Rule authorizes 
House Counsel to represent the House under direction of the Speaker, “who 
shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group.”106  This Rule 
arguably is sufficient for House Counsel to appear on behalf of the House in 
the kind of case I’m discussing, as either plaintiff or defendant-intervenor, 
if authorized by the Speaker.107  As mentioned above, there’s no reason 
Congress couldn’t formalize this by concurrent resolution, either as a 
standing matter or in one-off votes.  Or the House could do so by its own 
resolution. 
 
when authorized by state law”; no such authorization in the case at bar).  The Court has 
expressly left open the question whether the Take Care Clause or the Appointments Clause 
might render unconstitutional statutes authorizing private parties to sue to recover funds on 
behalf of the United States (“qui tam” suits). See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States 
ex rel. Jonathan Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000) (otherwise holding that “qui tam” plaintiffs 
have Article III standing and that states are not persons under the relevant statute and thus 
not subject to liability). 
 105. See 2 U.S.C. § 288b(c).  In INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), both houses 
specifically authorized intervention to defend the constitutionality of a statute when the INS 
was refusing to defend it. See id. The Court said, “We have long held that Congress is the 
proper party to defend the validity of a statute when an agency of government, as a 
defendant charged with enforcing the statute, agrees with plaintiffs that the statute is 
inapplicable or unconstitutional.” Id. at 940. 
 106. RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 103, at R. II(8). 
 107. It has worked for House intervention as a defendant in the DOMA section 3 cases 
that President Obama has refused to defend. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, Nos. 12-2335-cv(L), 12-2435(Con.), 2012 WL 4937310 (2d Cir. Oct. 
18, 2012), petition for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-63 (U.S. July 15, 2012), petition 
for cert. before judgment filed, No. 12-307 (U.S. Sept. 11, 2012).  The magistrate judge 
approved House intervention in Windsor by applying F.R.C.P. Rule 24(a)(2). See 797 F. 
Supp. 2d 320, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  I take no position on whether application of that rule, or 
any federal intervention rule, is necessary in cases such as this (as opposed to following the 
trail from 2 U.S.C. § 130f through House Rule II(8) and the Speaker’s direction of the House 
Counsel). 
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CONCLUSION 
So, we have a way out of the interpretive schizophrenia that occurs when 
a President deems a statute unconstitutional, decides he cannot defend it in 
court, but enforces the law nonetheless so that he can injure someone and 
thus create a classically justiciable federal court case.  Presidents should, at 
least sometimes, not enforce statutes they deem unconstitutional; that’s part 
of seeing the authority for interpreting the Constitution as residing in 
multiple repositories of power, in all government officials, not just courts.  
This same notion of blended powers should allow us to see Congress as an 
appropriate plaintiff in federal court to challenge presidential constitutional 
nonenforcement.  Congress, or either house, is injured when the President 
treats a properly enacted law as if it were a nullity; or we can see Congress, 
or either house, as suing on behalf of an injured United States. 
 
